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THOUGHTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS LEAGUES AND THE APPLICATION OF
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE*
INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union's victory in the 1988 Olympic basketball competi-
tion illustrates the growing popularity of "American" sports in foreign
countries.' The National Basketball Association ("NBA"), Major
League Baseball, National Football League ("NFL") and National
Hockey League ("NHL") are all involved in some level of international
competition. Major League Baseball and the NHL have franchises in
Canada and all of the leagues have played a variety of exhibition games
in Europe or Japan.2 The NFL has announced that it may begin some
form of international play as early as 1991 with its Worldwide League of
American Football ("WLAF").
3
There is a good deal of evidence to support the proposition that a
truly international sports league could prove to be quite lucrative to
league organizers. First, the value of the Olympic Games, the world's
most popular sports competition, is largely based on international tele-
vision viewer interest. 4 The Olympic television negotiators for the 1992
Barcelona Games were seeking a record $500 million for the network
rights to broadcast the two week sporting event. 5 Similarly, the overseas
broadcast rights for the NBA are currently $4 million and projected to
be $25 million by 1995.6 If an international professional sports league
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. B.A., 1977, Stanford University; J.D. 1980, Columbia University School of
Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the research grant provided by the Sol C. Snider
Entrepreneurial Center for this project.
I. The New York Times in a sports section cover story titled, U.S. Sports Heading
Overseas discussed the presence of U.S. based sports around the world. See Eskenazi, U.S.
Sports Heading Overseas: Pro Leagues in America Eye the Globe, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1989, Sec. 8,
at 1, col. 2. See generally B. RADER, AMERICAN SPORTS: FROM THE AGE OF FOLK GAMES TO
THE AGE OF SPECTATORS (1983). The NHL's roots are Canadian. See, e.g., Philadelphia
World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 465-66 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (discussing the League's Canadian origins).
2. The NBA recently announced that it would be the first to play regular season
games overseas, announcing two games inJapan for the 1990-91 season. See Sports Indus-
try News, Feb. 24, 1989, at 62. See, e.g., Delaney, Celtics Victorious As Toast of Madrid, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1988, at C2, col. 5. See also Rosenblatt, A Global NFL Scramble, SPORTS INC.
Oct. 10, 1988, at 3.
3. Most descriptions of the league refer to it as a sort of "minor" league or "farm
system" for the NFL. Such a league could be used to develop athletes for the "major"
leagues.
4. See Rosner, Rights Talks Cut Off, SPORTS INC., March 13, 1989 (noting that addi-
tional money will be paid for rights in other countries as well).
5. See Sports Industry News, Oct. 14, 1988, at 315.
6. See Cone, Playing the Global Game, FORBES, Jan. 23, 1989, at 90.
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is successfully developed, the monetary demands on network bidders
and potential sponsors and advertisers could be astronomical. 7 The
economic equation must also include the dismantling of the Eastern
Bloc and the unification of the European market in 1992.
In addition to these television revenues, the revenues from league
licensing and endorsements may be quite large as well.8 It is logical to
assume that foreign interest in a sport will increase if the fans actually
have their own home team. Along with greater interest comes increased
television viewership and increased revenues to the networks and the
leagues.
No defined structure of an international league or the nature of a
true "world championship" has yet been publicly developed. For exam-
ple, it would be simple enough for the champion of Major League Base-
ball, or the existing World Series, to play the champion of its Japanese
counterpart. Individual games and series have taken place a number of
times over the years between American and Japanese teams with no spe-
cific "championship" designation given to the winner.9 Robert Whiting,
in his examination ofJapanese baseball You Gotta Have Wa, cites 28 visits
by American professional baseball teams from 1908 to 1988.10
The focus of this article is on the potential antitrust issues in the
operation of a truly international league. The article examines the po-
tential sources of legal actions by private entities as well as actions that
might be supported under various existing domestic and international
government antitrust enforcement guidelines. The overall assumption
is that the leagues hypothetically discussed are fully integrated interna-
tional entities. This is not a discussion of an occasional meeting of
teams, the special exhibition appearance, a minor league or the financial
or social merits of such a league. There are certainly financial factors
that point against the formation of such a league. The costs of travel for
a team and equipment are just two monetary considerations.II Televi-
7. There certainly are strong arguments against the profitability of an international
league as well. The arguments used by leagues against domestic expansion and the de-
gree that the need to share league revenues with more partners might offset whatever
franchise fee is paid in the long run is applicable to international expansion as well. See
generally Noll, The Economics of Sports in Leagues in LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR
SPORTS (Uberstine ed.).
8. See Cone, supra note 6, noting that over $50 million worth of Converse brand NBA
licensed shoes are sold outside of the United States. Id. at 91.
9. See also Sanger,Japanese Team's Improvement Surprised U.S. All-Stars, N.Y. Times, Nov.
15, 1988, at D27, col. 3, discussing a U.S. All-star team tour ofJapan ending with a record
of three victories, two losses and two ties.
Former Baseball Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti had stated that "the game must
be brought abroad" but he cautioned that it must be done "without imperialistic desire to
run it but to promote it." He did note that exposure to the game abroad will aid in
marketing concerns. Address by A. Bartlett Giamatti, Seton Hall Law School Sports Law
Symposium (April 28, 1989).
10. See R. WHITING, You GOrTA HAVE WA 331-332 (1989).
11. Obviously the travel costs for an NBA franchise are less than that for an NFL or
Major League Baseball franchise. The squads in the NBA are smaller. However, it is pos-
sible that the Major League Baseball (American League/National League) format could be
utilized. For example, the "European League" in basketball could play the champions of
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sion time zones, language and exchange rates likewise are other factors
that would have to be examined.
The focus here is on the antitrust issues and the policy considera-
tions that will effect the application of these laws to global issues. This
analysis uses three hypothetical models to outline the major antitrust
issues that could confront an international sports league from its forma-
tion stage on through some of the ongoing problems that would be
unique to an operational international professional sports league.
Model I examines a merger or joint venture that forms an interna-
tional league. This would be the potential mode for creation in Major
League Baseball, the NBA and the NHL. 12 In all of these sports, there
are leagues already in existence in foreign countries. 13 In baseball, as
was noted, there is a league in existence in Japan that has maintained its
present format for over 30 years. 14 There are also fledgling leagues in
existence elsewhere, including Italy. 15 The quality of play in these
countries is much behind that of the U.S. The overseas basketball
leagues have served as a final stop or a negotiating alternative for NBA
players. 16 They too, someday, may be appropriate for a merger. Fi-
nally, there are more Americans playing hockey in leagues in Europe
than in the National Hockey League in North America.17
Football serves as the example for Model II, which is the direct ex-
port of an existing American sports entity to a foreign country. The
NFL does not currently have a counterpart outside of North America.
Although the Canadian Football League ("CFL") has been in existence
for decades, even a merger of those two North American entities would
not give football the international flavor for a true world champion-
ship. 18 There are football teams in existence in a few European coun-,
tries and a league that even has its own "super bowl" and a seasonal
publication in Italy. These developed largely due to the influence of
televised NFL games overseas and recent preseason games played in
the NBA so that the NBA team would not have to travel overseas until that championship
game.
12. These leagues could also certainly use the expansion mode set out in Model II,
and in fact, as is discussed below, there may be many advantages to the expansion mode.
13. Professional basketball exists in Italy and Spain and professional baseball exists in
Japan and to a lesser degree in Italy. See XX 60 Minutes Transcripts No. 53 at 10 (noting
that 14 teams play baseball in the Seriat Nazionale, national league).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. John Nash, General Manager of the NBA's Philadelphia 76ers, noted that many of
the leagues in Europe can compete for players at the $200,000-$300,000 salary range.
The major shortcoming at present for growth in Europe is the size of the arenas, seating a
maximum of approximately 5,000 people. He estimates that by the year 2000 there will be
real competition with the NBA. Presentation by John Nash at The Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania (March 15, 1989) [hereinafter Nash presentation].
17. See U.S., Canada Players Cross the Atlantic For Ice Time, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 19,
1989, at IE, col. 5.
18. Interestingly, the CFL has made overtures of expanding into the United States,
noting a particular interest in those cities that want, but have not been able to obtain, an
NFL franchise. See CFL-Looks to Expand, USA Today, July 12, 1988, at Cl, col. 1.
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major European cities. 19 Because of the tremendous disparity in the
quality of play between those teams and the NFL, however, it is not
likely that a merger would take place. If Japanese baseball is a few de-
cades off from its American counterpart, the club football teams are
light-years away. In this second model it would actually be necessary to
"expand" or place new franchises in foreign cities, thus causing a differ-
ent set of international antitrust problems to arise.
Model III notes the possibility of the formation of a completely new
league. It presents the pitfalls that can be avoided by taking care in
forming the domestic or international entity. Furthermore, this section
chronicles some operational concerns that may develop in a completely
new entity.
The models are not meant to predict how the various leagues might
"go international" or even that they in fact will. The models are truly
the author's guess today of how internationalization might best occur.
For example, there is talk of creation of a Global Hockey League as a
newly created entity, as set out in Model III, not the discussed merger
method herein. 20 Obviously there are initial jurisdictional concerns in
any extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. As those jurisdictional con-
cerns are addressed, the potential to apply a foreign states' antitrust
laws should be considered as well. 2 1 An interpretation of antitrust is-
sues, particularly the rule of reason, single entity defense, and the labor
exemption, is quite complex in its own right. With the application of
U.S. antitrust laws to the internationalization of professional sports
leagues, the complexity only increases. This article begins with a brief
overview of the jurisdictional issues in applying antitrust laws. Antitrust
actions may be brought both by private individuals and the federal gov-
ernment under the Sherman Act. The analysis then covers the applica-
tion and policy issues in the three hypothetical models. A look at the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws to sports franchise relo-
cations and player movement issues concludes this article.
I. JURISDICTION
Generally the Sherman Act applies to activities "in" or "affecting"
commerce in the United States. 22 U.S. ownership of a franchise located
in a foreign state and a member of a U.S. based league would probably
require that that entity be subject to U.S. antitrust laws. The traditional
analysis emanates from United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Al-
19. See Telander, Go Downpitch and Buttonhook Smartly, .1ate, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug.
11, 1986, at 22; Gammon, The Brits are Having a Ball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 7, 1986, at
34.
20. See Fitzpatrick, Clarke Hits the Road as Super Scout, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 4,
1990, at 3-E, col. 1.
21. Obviously an examination of every possible law would be quite expansive and
beyond the scope of this article. Therefore the substantive focus is on United States anti-
trust laws. An interesting fourth model that could be used to examine these foreign laws is
a foreign based soccer league with a U.S. franchise.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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coa "),23 which introduced an "effects" test of subject matter jurisdiction
under the antitrust laws. Under this test, the courts of the United States
have jurisdiction over any conduct that has an intended effect on com-
merce within the United States. 24 The test for what constitutes a suffi-
cient effect has varied among the different courts. Nonetheless, in an
international league, the effects on U.S. commerce are clearly expected
and intended, especially in the case of a U.S. based league. Any league
activity in a foreign country necessarily affects the league as a whole and
has an effect on commerce in the United States.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came up with a different analy-
sis in 1976, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America ("Timberlane 1").25
The circuit court found fault with the Alcoa analysis for failing to con-
sider the interests of the foreign nation, as well as the nature of the rela-
tionship of the actors and the U.S. 26 The court then established a multi-
factored analysis, including issues regarding both foreign and domestic
interests. The test actually consists of balancing numerous interests,
and has been referred to as a "jurisdictional rule of reason." This analy-
sis has been accepted by the Third,2 7 Fifth, 2 8 and Tenth29 Circuits.
Under this analysis in the international league cases, the balance would
almost certainly fall on the side of U.S. courts having jurisdiction, as the
U.S. interest in the entire league would be strong enough to outweigh
the interests of foreign countries with smaller stakes. This would defi-
nitely be the case in a U.S. based league, but the issue might be more
complicated in a European-based league with a smaller U.S. stake.
In 1982, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act
("FTAIA")3° further refined the appropriate jurisdictional analysis,
maintaining that there must be a "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable" effect on U.S. domestic commerce in order to exert juris-
diction under the Sherman Act. Further amplification of this was ex-
pressed in Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgian Airlines,3' where Judge Wilkey
articulated that "[j]urisdiction exists under United States antitrust laws
whenever conduct is intended to, and results in, substantial effects
within the United States."
'3 2
23. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. Id. at 444.
25. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 611-12.
27. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1301 (3d Cir. 1979).
28. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 884-5 (5th Cir.
1982).
29. Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). The American Bar Associ-
ation's sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice formed a task force to
review a draft of these rules. They criticized the Department on this point for not consid-
ering comity issues raised in Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976). The jurisdictional standard which is probably applicable was more re-
cently expressed in 549 F.2d at 925.
31. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
32. Id. at 925; see also A. Ahistrom Osakeyhtio v. E.C. Commission, Case No. 89/85
(Ct. ofJustice, 1988) (indicating that the FTAIA guidelines are appropriate).
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Underlying any jurisdictional analysis is whether a court will actu-
ally be able to enforce an antitrust judgment. In dealing with a United
States based entity that issue is not so problematic. A judgment can be
enforced against individuals in this country or against their property.
There has been, however, a great deal of activity by foreign states to
deny the enforcement of judgments in their country based on United
States antitrust law. The general basis for denying enforcement is sov-
ereign immunity. That doctrine is based on the international law princi-
ple that the courts of one country cannot enforce their judgments
against another country. 3 3 Thus, there is potentially a degree of protec-
tion for the foreign based segment of the merger or joint venture.
In summary, under the basic jurisdictional guidelines that do exist,
an international merger, joint venture or other expansion activity by a
United States based sports league is probably subject to the scrutiny of
U.S. antitrust laws. However, there may be, as there is with any other
international legal judgment, the problem of enforcement. Where there
is American ownership of the foreign franchise the judgment should not
be as difficult to enforce. There are judicial tools in place to bring a
judgment personally against an owner based in the U.S. or his or her
property located in the United States. The more difficult cases arise




A. Model I. Merger or Joint Venture
Of all the legal issues that might be addressed regarding the devel-
opment of international leagues, possibly the most interesting is the ap-
plication of U.S. antitrust laws to a U.S. based league entering into the
international marketplace. This is largely due to the difficulty courts
have had in applying antitrust laws to purely domestic sports issues.
The application of antitrust laws in sports may be appropriately charac-
terized as stare decisis gone awry.3 5 In some situations, such as the judi-
cially created antitrust exemption for baseball, the law has been
relatively consistent.3 6 In other areas, such as sports franchise reloca-
33. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospaceworkers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The United Kingdom, Australia
and Canada also have "clawback" provisions which allow suits against plaintiffs to force
the return of antitrust awards through local court awards. See, e.g., Protection of Trading
Intersts Act (1980) and Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 834 (1982) (United Kingdom); Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act
1984, No. 3 AUSTL. ACTS (1984), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985) (Canada). Regarding
controversy over "clawback" provisions. See Note, Enjoining the Applications of the British
Protections of Trading Act in Private American's Antitrust Litigation, 79 MICH. L. REV. (1981).
34. For a thorough summary of the jurisdiction under Justice Department Guidelines
see, S. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTIAL GUIDE TO THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES A-I 1- 18 (1989).
35. See Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, The Rule of Reason
and the Doctrine ofAncillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943 (1988).
36. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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tions, many commentators have viewed the application of the law as ex-
tremely inconsistent.
3 7
Historically, antitrust issues have been the basis for major sports'
legal battles: Al Davis in his battle to move the Oakland Raiders to Los
Angeles, Curt Flood in his battle not to be traded, and numerous player
union actions against their respective leagues. 38 The initial issue in this
first model is the level of antitrust scrutiny an international merger
might receive.
1. Antitrust Generally
Most antitrust litigation in sports has involved Section 1 of the
Sherman Act which provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." '3 9 Section 1 relates primarily to agreements between parties
that impede competition. A number of the cases in this area have dealt
with the rights of athletes to negotiate freely with various teams in a
given league or with teams in a competing league. The restrictions that
the teams agree to that bar a complete free market for the athletes are
commonly referred to as restrictions on "free agency."
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is also applicable to league actions
against member franchises. The area where this application has re-
ceived the most attention is in cases involving sports franchise reloca-
tions. When franchise rights are granted, a specific geographic territory
is assigned. The franchise owner further agrees not to move the home
games of the franchise without the initial approval of fellow owners.
Conflicts arise when the individual franchise owner disagrees with fellow
owners and relocates without consent, or where league consent is de-
nied. Improper denial by the league has been held to violate the anti-
trust laws. The leading case which addressed this issue is Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League.40 There the NFL
was found to have restrained competition by voting not to allow the then
Oakland Raiders to relocate to Los Angeles, a city already occupied by
the Rams franchise.
4 1
To a lesser degree, courts have analyzed league antitrust issues
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The concern of Section 2, as it
relates to sports leagues, is primarily whether the behavior of a league
restricts entry by potential rival leagues and whether that behavior es-
tablishes the league as an illegal monopoly. The most recent sports
league case to examine this issue was United States Football League v. Na-
37. See Roberts, supra note 33.
38. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258. See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. NFL, 791 F.2d
1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
40. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987). See also National
Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
484 U.S. 960 (1987).
41. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, 791 F.2d at 1356.
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tional Football League, where the NFL was found to be an illegal monop-
oly.4 2 In that case, the recently formed USFL brought an action against
the NFL alleging, among other things, that the NFL monopolized the
sport of professional football in this country and conspired to drive the
USFL out of business. 4 3 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in part,
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ,,44 Under Sec-
tion 2, a plaintiff must also show that the defendant league willfully ac-
quired and maintained monopoly power and as a result of these actions
the plaintiff was injured.
45
2. Mergers and Joint Ventures
a. Mergers
Mergers are fertile territory for the application of antitrust law. The
main concern is that a horizontal merger which extends an existing mar-
ket may result in the anticompetitive and social consequences the anti-
trust laws seek to protect against. 46 Any entities considering a merger
must not only consult the case law, but also the merger guidelines issued
by the Department of Justice 4 7 and the Federal Trade Commission.
48
Generally, if competing firms with substantial shares of a market merge,
there may be a government challenge and a possible finding of a viola-
tion of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.49 Private parties may bring lawsuits
under the Clayton Act as well. 50 The Department of Justice guidelines
also make specific reference to international mergers. The key concern
of those guidelines are that the merger would not likely result in a net
decrease in consumer welfare.
5 '
A merger may also be scrutinized under the Sherman Act. Under
that statute, the concern is whether the merger can be viewed as a "con-
42. See 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 842 F.2d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1988)
(where the court found that the NFL had used its monopoly power particularly to injure
the USFL. Although found to be a monopoly, damages were nominal. Id.). The first Sec-
tion 2 case of the Sherman Act involving a sports league was American Football League v.
National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
43. United States Football League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1976).
45. The AFL case, supra note 43, focused primarily on the possession of monopoly
power; the USFL case on the intent to acquire or maintain monopoly power. In addition
to monopolization action, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, can be used to attack attempts to
monopolize as well as conspiracies to monopolize.
46. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 575-675 (1977).
47. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823-03 (June 29, 1984)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
48. For guidelines used by state attorneys general, see Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the
National Association of Attorneys General (March 10, 1987), reprinted in 52 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at 476 (March 12, 1987).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
50. Id.
51. See Guidelines, supra note 48.
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tract, combination ... or conspiracy" under Section 152 or as a monopo-
lization attempt or conspiracy to monopolize under Section 2.53 Merger
analysis, however, typically occurs under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
54
Section 7 specifically prohibits the acquisition of the stock or assets
of another entity where the result of their acquisition "may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly ... in any
line of commerce .... -55 Generally, the prima facie case, which must be
established under the Clayton Act, requires a showing that the merger
will lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the relevant
product and geographic market. Historically, sports league mergers
have been a key focus for antitrust scrutiny. In the past, the two largest
modern sports league mergers were accomplished by a statutory exemp-
tion for the 1970 merger of the old American Football League and the
NFL,56 and the NBA-American Basketball Association merger through
the court supervised Robertson Settlement Agreement.
5 7
b. Joint Ventures
A joint venture analysis is similar to a merger and so the same gen-
eral issues apply. A joint venture between a U.S. entity and a foreign-
based league is a possible route for international play. Ajoint venture is
generally defined as "[a] legal entity in the nature of a partnership en-
gaged in the joint prosecution of a particular transaction for mutual
profit." 58 Thejoint venture mode of operation allows for some autono-
mous operation of the separate leagues in their own countries.
The Justice Department Guidelines regarding international anti-
trust enforcement establish a four pronged analysis. 59 The first two
prongs are similar to the basic enforcement policy of the Department,
that is, whether the anticompetitive effect is outweighed by the procom-
petitive benefits. 60 The next prong examines the competitive effects of
ancillary non-price vertical restraints. If these three steps indicate that
the joint venture is likely to be anticompetitive, then the joint venturers
must prove that the procompetitive efficiencies of the joint venture out-
weigh the risk of anticompetitive harm. 6 1 As with merger, the strongest
argument against a successful antitrust action is that ajoint venture does
not decrease competition.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
55. Id.
56. Pub. L. No. 89-800, S. b(6)(1), 80 Stat. 1515 (1966), amending Pub. L. No. 87-
331, S. 1, 75 Stat. 732 (1961), 15 U.S.C. 1291 (1961).
57. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
58. BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY 753 (5th ed. 1979).
59. Trade Regulations Rep. (CCH) 13,109 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Guidelines].
60. International Guidelines, at 20,599-20,605; See Report: Analysis of Department of Justice
Guidelines International Operations & Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 957, 961
(1988) (analyzing the joint venture section of the International Guidelines).
61. Id.
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3. Baseball
The sport of baseball is unique in that it enjoys a judicially created
antitrust exemption. 62 The exemption originally applied specifically to
the size and the power of the league and not to player restraints as it is
generally applied today. Even though courts have continued to uphold
the exemption over the years, an international sports league merger has
never been contemplated by the courts. Many commentators, including
Supreme Court Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, have
argued that the exemption should not continue to exist.
63
The exemption was originally created in Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs 6 4 because the sport
of baseball was deemed excluded from "interstate commerce." Affect-
ing interstate commerce is a necessary element to violate the Sherman
Act. The Court noted specifically that the sport was merely a state af-
fair.65 Ironically, in one of the most illustrative examples ofjudicial ad-
herence to the policy of stare decisis is the exemption of baseball from
antitrust law. The exemption exists today even though baseball is now
clearly recognized, even by the Supreme Court, as being part of inter-
state commerce. 66 Each time the exemption is challenged there is the
opportunity for a court to inhibit further expansion of the exemption.
An international application may be such an opportunity. The rationale
used by the Court, in addition to stare decisis, is Congressional lack of
action.67 Since 1922, Congress has had the opportunity to pass legisla-
tion which would include baseball within the domain of antitrust law and
it has not done so. Because of Congressional inactivity, the courts con-
tinue to follow the 1922 exemption.
One policy argument for the continuation of this exemption is that
baseball developed within this antitrust protection, and it should not be
removed now. A question that a court would be confronted with is
whether this protection should continue beyond domestic borders into
the international development of the sport?
Another factor that should influence courts in international anti-
trust actions is who the plaintiff is in the action. The parties most likely
to test the continuing exemption would be a competing league or a
player. In baseball, until recently, a competing league as a plaintiff was
unlikely. Major League Baseball has not had any serious competition in
75 years. 68 An action by a player or possibly a players' union is the most
62. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also Radovich v. National Football League, 352
U.S. 445 (1957).
63. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292-93 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
65. Id.
66. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
67. Flood, 407 U.S. at 281-83 (viewing the lack of congressional action regarding the
baseball exemption over a50 year period as "something other than mere congressional
silence and passivity." Id. at 283).
68. See Chass, New League Plots to Take Mound, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, sec. 8, at 1.
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probable course.
Antitrust actions have been brought against mergers and joint ven-
tures under the theory that they reduce competition. An action by a
player or a players' union in baseball would probably raise that same
issue. In Robertson v. National Basketball Association 6 9 an antitrust action
was initiated because of the proposed merger between the National Bas-
ketball Association and the then competing American Basketball Associ-
ation ("ABA"). 70 A primary concern was the impact the merger of the
two leagues would have on the market for players. The obvious fear
being that the elimination of a competitor in the marketplace would
eliminate the bidding for players' services and lower average contract
prices. Although the Robertson case involved basketball, the possibility of
a merger eliminating a source of competing bids is enlightening. A forty
percent increase in NBA players' salaries in their first five years of com-
petition from 1967-72 is directly attributed to the competition from the
ABA. 7 1 The rapid salary growth slowed following the NBA/ABA
merger to an initial annual rate of less than ten percent.
7 2
It is this same issue, whether players' salaries would decrease, that
might predominate in an international merger situation. Although
player restraint actions have not been successful in baseball, this would
be yet another opportunity to test the strength of the exemption of base-
ball from antitrust law reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Flood v.
Kuhn.73 The Robertson analogy is particularly applicable because in re-
cent years the threat of playing in Japan has been used as a negotiating
tactic by several players, and some, most notably Bob Horner, then of
the Atlanta Braves, have actually played there.74 Reportedly Horner
signed with the Yakult Swallows in Japan for one year at $1.3 million
with a reported $500,000 signing bonus after rejecting an offer from the
Atlanta Braves for a three year contract at $3.9 million. 75 Homer was
unique in that at the age of 29 he was one of the first Major League
Baseball players to go to Japan while still in his prime. 76 An existing
league has been used for leverage during salary negotiations, as in Rob-
ertson, to increase player salaries. Obviously, with an international
merger the alternative market afforded by the Japanese would be fore-
There have, however, been recent discussions of creating a new domestic league partially
in response to television network competition increasing for sports programming. See
Sports Industry News, May 19, 1989, at 152.
69. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y., 1975).
70. Id.
71. See Noll, supra note 7, at 45.
72. Id. at 46. There are other market factors that may cause player salaries to in-
crease. Without competition from another league baseball salaries increased dramatically
due to free agency following the Messersmith-McNaty arbitration ruling giving baseball play-
ers the right to test the open market at some point in their career. See 66 LAB. ARB. Disp.
SETTrLEMENTS 1011 (1975).
73. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
74. See Wolff, A New Kind of Orient Express, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 18, 1987, at 28.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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closed to players and competition for athletes in the baseball market
decreased.
It would seem that a court would give serious consideration to an
antitrust action by a player or players' union if American baseball
merged with Japanese baseball. The two factors that the plaintiffs would
have to overcome first would be the antitrust exemption, and second to
prove that competition in the market for baseball players was actually
decreased.
To overcome the baseball exemption, a court would probably have
to distinguish the international case from past cases or justify their pol-
icy decision not to adhere to the principle of stare decisis. Apart from
the sentiment expressed in Flood against the exemption, one court did
hold that the exemption was not applicable. In 1949, in Gardella v. Chan-
d/et",7 7 Danny Gardella prevailed in his antitrust action against Major
League Baseball, which he accused of "blacklisting" him because he
played in the rival Mexican league. No Major League Baseball team
would allow Gardella the opportunity to play with them. However, this
case was settled before the appeal was heard.
7 8
The effect that a merger would have on the market for baseball
players is a factual question. If a court does not perceive the Japanese
league as an alternative, then competition may not be viewed as being
greatly affected. The less competition is affected, the less likely an anti-
trust action against baseball is to-succeed.
4. Basketball
The Robertson case precedent would be directly applicable to an at-
tempted merger of existing European league franchises with the NBA.
Perhaps more importantly, no antitrust exemption exists in any sport
other than baseball. 79 Similar to baseball in Japan, only on a more com-
petitive level, the European leagues compete with the NBA for play-
ers. 80 Even if there is no genuine competition, the threat of playing in
another country is used more often in basketball negotiations than in
baseball. It appears that the experience is more "enjoyable" for the ath-
lete and there are more opportunities. The ploy of having a European
opportunity is used frequently by late first round draft picks. In the
77. 174 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1949).
78. Gardella reportedly received $60,000 from then Commissioner Chandler to drop
the case. See Maher, Danny Gardella Case Didn't Settle Anything, L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1975,
Part III.
79. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also Radovich v. National Football League, 352
U.S. 445 (1957).
80. Similarly in the NHL there is a steady stream of players to Europe. One report
notes that there are more North American hockey players in Europe than in the National
Hockey League. See U.S., Canada Players Cross The Atlantic For Ice Time, Philadelphia Inquirer
Feb. 19, 1989, at El, col. 5. See also Allen, U.S. Born Hockey Players Find Europe an Attractive
Alternative, USA Today, March 10, 1989, at 4C (indicating that 20 more Americans are
playing in Europe than in the NHL).
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1989 draft the second pick in the entire draft, Danny Ferry, rejected the
NBA Los Angeles Clippers and signed a reported one year contract for
one million dollars with the Messaggero Rome team of the Italian pro-
fessional league. 8 1 An international merger of basketball would raise
many of the same issues that were cited in the Robertson case, particularly
the elimination of a potential market for professional basketball players.
An antitrust action by a competing league against the NBA for at-
tempting to monopolize the basketball market would probably enjoy a
higher probability of success than in baseball. The simple explanation
again is the non-existence of an antitrust exemption for basketball.
It is also more likely that a legal action would be brought in a bas-
ketball context than in baseball. The success of the ABA in the 1960's
and early 1970's is a much more recent memory than competing base-
ball leagues of 75 years ago. The success of the "minor league" Conti-
nental Basketball Association lends some support to the proposition
that a competing basketball league could survive as opposed to a com-
peting baseball league as well. 82 The limited size of NBA squads indi-
cates that there may be a surplus of players adequate to form a league
that would attract fans.
Overall, the antitrust action by a competing league is more likely in
basketball than in baseball if there is a merger with a foreign entity.
5. Hockey
When considering a merger, hockey is confronted with many of the
same issues as basketball. There is no special exemption regarding the
application of antitrust laws to the sport and similarly, rival leagues have
competed with the NHL. In the first year of competition between the
NHL and the World Hockey Association ("WHA"), the 1971-72 average
NHL salary was $24,000.83 One year later, the salaries nearly doubled
to $40,000.84 Following the merger, salaries only increased an average
of seven percent per year the first six years.
8 5
Without the existence of a competing league domestically, the in-
ternational market has become an alternative for players in the NHL.
Although clearly not a perfect substitute for a domestic playing opportu-
nity, the European alternative does provide some competition. In 1989,
particularly with the value of the U.S. dollar dipping, European teams
were even better able to compete with the NHL. At present, however,
the price competition does not appear to be as great as the NBA-Euro-
pean league scenario, and clearly not on par with the domestic league
81. See Thomas, Ferry Reportedly Forgoing Clippers to Play for a Team in Rome, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 2, 1989, at A17, col. 2.
82. See SPORTS INDUSTRY NEWS, 296 (Sept. 22, 1989) (citing discussion between the
NBA and leaders of amateur basketball regarding an international basketball league).
83. Noll supra note 7, at 47.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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price wars. 86 An action by a competing league would be quite similar to
the scenario, discussed earlier, which confronts the NBA.
8 7
An NBA player action against a league merger in basketball may
have the highest probability of success within the sports reviewed under
this model. Although the salaries are clearly higher domestically, the
European alternative is a viable alternative. Further, there is no possi-
bility of an exemption being applied to basketball as in baseball.
B. Model II: Expansion
1. Antitrust
Under this model there will not be a merger between two existing
leagues, instead, the growth of a league will be accomplished by placing
new franchises in foreign countries, a method commonly referred to as
expansion. This method of growth is likely to be subject to far less anti-
trust scrutiny than discussed in Model 1.88 Gradual growth brought
about by expansion is subject to far less scrutiny than the dramatic crea-
tion of an entity through a merger.
The league most illustrative of the possibilities under this model is
the NFL. The NFL has already expressed interest in developing a spring
football league which would include franchises in foreign countries, to
compliment its existing fall schedule.8 9 The general jurisdictional issues
of the applicability of antitrust laws discussed initially are relevant
here. 90 Assuming the NFL remains based in the United States,
franchises in foreign countries will "affect" commerce domestically.
A court would probably have to conclude that the placement of
franchises in a few foreign cities would not constitute monopolization of
the "world" market. A court, as did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in AFL v. NFL, would probably hold that even with the NFL's occupation
of a few foreign markets there are plenty of open markets for occupation
by a new league. 9 1 In fact courts would probably view the initial entry
into a city as a "natural monopoly."'9 2 In AFL v. NFL the court held that:
American [Football League] complains that National [Football
League], the first upon the scene, had occupied the more desir-
able of the thirty-one potential sites for team locations ... the
86. U.S. and Canadian players tend to sign for the same or less than they would re-
ceive in the minor league American Hockey League or International Hockey League.
87. No copy.
88. Interestingly the argument raised most often regarding expansion is that not
enough takes place. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984) (an action arguing unsuccessfully that the NFL violated anti-
trust laws by not granting the city of Memphis, Tennessee an NFL franchise).
89. See supra note 2.
90. See infra note 92.
91. 323 F.2d 124, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1963).
92. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945),
where Judge Learned Hand defines a "natural monopoly" as "a market so limited that it is
impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant large
enough to supply the whole demand." Id. (Obviously the analogy is that a city, or in the
case of foreign markets, maybe a country, can only support one team).
[Vol. 67:2
1990] INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 207
fact that its [NFL] teams . . . enjoyed a natural monopoly does
noi occasion a violation of the antitrust laws unless the natural
monopoly power of those teams was misused to gain a competi-
tive advantage for teams located in other cities, or for the
league as a whole. It frequently happens that a first competitor
in the field will acquire sites which a latecomer may think more
desirable than the remaining available sites, but the firstcomer
is not required to surrender any, or all, of its desirable sites to
the latecomer simply to enable the latecomer to compete more
effectively with it .... When one has acquired a natural monop-
oly by means which are neither exclusionary, unfair, nor preda-
tory, he is not disempowered to defend his position fairly. 9 3
This method of internationalization will probably not violate U.S. anti-
trust laws. Any case brought would not prevail so long as the expansion
methods are reasonable and there is no predatory intent. This clearly
differs from Model I where market competition is being instantly re-
duced by eliminating a market competitor.
The International Guidelines seem to confirm this view. They pres-
ent a two pronged test to determine whether the Justice Department will
pursue an action for monopolization. First, the market share of the en-
tity is examined, 94 as well as the concentration of the entity in the mar-
ket and the probability of new entrants. If this analysis results in the
"dangerous probability" of creating or sustaining a monopoly, then the
second prong of the test is applied to observe whether the conduct
under scrutiny is predatory.9 5
It appears that there must be some intent on the part of the interna-
tional league to bring harm to another entity. 96 Creators of new leagues
have alleged, as well as the National Football League Players Associa-
tion, that the intent of the NFL in creating its WLAF is to prevent the
development of another competing league. Indeed, one likely plaintiff
in this model would be an upstart league, which would argue that the
expanding league is monopolizing the world market. The failure of ear-
lier leagues with similar arguments within domestic markets, however,
indicates the likely outcome of an international case.
Even more tenuous is the case for an athlete. Expansion does not
directly decrease competition for the athlete's services because, unlike a
merger, expansion generally does not negatively affect price competi-
tion and it simultaneously does increase the overall number of employ-
ment opportunities. A successful action by an athlete would have to
93. AFL, 323 F.2d at 131. Further the court noted that "[ilt is not unlike the choice a
chain store company makes when it selects a particular corner lot as the location of a new
store. It preempts that lot when it acquires it for that purpose, but, as long as there are
other desirable locations for similar stores in a much broader area, it cannot be said to
have monopolized the area, or, in a legal sense, the lt or its immediate vicinity." Id. at
130.
94. International Guidelines, supra note 60, at 20,595-20,596.
95. Id. at 20,595.
96. Id.
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allege that the expansion prevented another league from forming that
would have created price competition.
C. Model III: Formation of a new entity
The formation of a new entity, which has met with little success do-
mestically, could avoid many of the legal pitfalls of the first two interna-
tional league models. The creator of a completely new league could
form the entity with each potential antitrust issue in mind. There exists
enough sports league experience for international league developers to
avoid many of the start-up pitfalls.
One recently formed entity tried to take advantage of some of this
available experience. The sport of arena football was structured as a
corporation, with each team acting as a subsidiary. The goal of such a
structure is to, presumably, place all antitrust disputes between league
members squarely within the so-called Copperweld or "single entity" ex-
emption. 9 7 This single entity argument maintains that it takes two enti-
ties to conspire or enter into an agreement to limit competition, and a
single entity cannot do that. That argument, from Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corporation,98 has unsuccessfully been asserted as a de-
fense by a number of plaintiffs in sports litigation. 9 9 In Copperweld, the
issue was whether a parent corporation and its two subsidiaries, or two
sister corporations, could conspire under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court held that the parties were not capable of conspiring
because they were a single entity.
Although forming the league as a single entity theoretically elimi-
nates conspiracy problems, there is still the possibility that the entity can
be found to be a monopoly. However, this is unlikely for a completely
new entity, since it is not clear how such a monopoly could be created by
an entity starting out with no market power at all. Detractors of the
applicability of the single entity defense to sports leagues argue that no
individual team could compete without its fellow league members. In
response to that query, Professor Goldman within a recent article asked
how have the Harlem Globetrotters managed to survive financially for
years without being members of a professional sports league.10 0 Their
special brand of "barnstorming" was at one point more popular than
the NBA and their games were used to boost attendance at NBA
games.1
0
The new entity would be the most difficult to develop but, if organ-
97. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
100. Although Professor Goldman's point is quite valuable, it does not address the
operation of a traditional sports league. A league by definition, contains member
franchises that compete against each other. Goldman, Sports Antitrust, and the Single Entity
Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751 (1989).
101. See L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 127 (1977).
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ized properly it would be subject to the least amount of antitrust
scrutiny.
III. POST FORMATION ISSUES
Once the international league is formed, whether by merger, expan-
sion, or the creation of a new entity, all of the leagues will then be vul-
nerable to post formation antitrust issues. This section assumes the
existence of an international league, regardless of the manner of crea-
tion, and examines how two troublesome antitrust outcomes may vary
due to their international nature.
A. International Franchise Relocations
Once the league is in operation, it may be confronted with an issue
that has dominated the 1980's - - unilateral franchise relocation. The
primary concern of league officials is the relocation of a franchise by an
owner without first obtaining league permission. The leading franchise
relocation case is Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Foot-
ball League. 1
0 2
Although it has not been tested in the courts, in general, a league
could probably ban an international relocation without consent. This
conclusion requires two assumptions. First, the decision not to allow a
franchise to relocate must be based on objective standards set forth in
league constitutions and by-laws as outlined in Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Commission. The second assumption is that there is no existing
franchise in the city where the franchise relocates.10 3 The apparent rule
is that a move by a franchise to a city with an existing franchise increases
competition; the head-to-head competition between two franchises in
the same city which, according to the case law, is the type of competition
the Sherman Act desires to promote.' 0 4 In contrast, a move to a city
where there is no franchise would not increase competition and thus
courts would probably uphold a league action denying a relocation
request. 105
The one issue worth considering is how broadly an individual fran-
102. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
103. Id. This is presumed to be the case even though there was a relocation without
consent in the NFL and no antitrust action brought by the League. This was, however,
probably due to the unique circumstances of the case. The former Baltimore Colts move
to Indianapolis without NFL consent came on the heels of the multi-million dollar damage
award against the NFL in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir. 1984). Ironically, Indianapolis is a city that did not have a NFL franchise and a
league action barring the relocation may not have been found by a court to be
anticompetitive.
104. Id. A primary issue in that case was the fact that there was already a franchise in
the metropolitan Los Angeles area.
105. This has not been tested. In the NFL the two most recent relocations, Baltimore
to Indianapolis and St. Louis to Phoenix occurred without League legal action. See Sneak
Play, TIME 71 (April 9, 1984) (Baltimore Colts' relocation to Baltimore); Eskenazi, N.F.L.
Votes to Approve Cardinals' Move fflest, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at B6, col. 3. (St. Louis
Cardinals' relocation to Phoenix).
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chisee's territory would be viewed. Initially, would there be a plan to
have only one team per country? And, if that is the case, for antitrust
analysis purposes, should a country be viewed as analogous to a city, or
does it merit different classification?
No court has formally approved the relocation rules of a profes-
sional sports league. One rationale for the league relocation rules is
that leagues know best where franchises should be located. Seemingly,
placement in the international markets would be that much more sensi-
tive, so a league would have a greater interest or rationale for control-
ling international relocations. Thus, even if there is no franchise in the
foreign city where a team relocates, there is probably greater validity to
the league barring that relocation than exists in a domestic relocation
under similar circumstances.
B. Player Movement
Athletes in all major sports are subject to, in varying degrees, invol-
untary "transfer" to another team. Most commonly this occurs through
trades, where a team exchanges a player, cash, draft picks, or some com-
bination of these for the same from a franchise in the same league.
Some star players may have "no-trade" clauses in their contracts, how-
ever, most athletes do not.
Once an international league is established, issues regarding an ath-
lete's right to determine where he plays expand as well. It is not difficult
to sympathize with a player's desire not to be traded from say, St. Louis
to Philadelphia, particularly when one considers the social, family, and
business attachments that may have been developed in the former city.
That sentiment increases that much more if the move to be considered is
one from St. Louis to Madrid, Spain.
The move from St. Louis to Philadelphia was the act that prompted
former Major League Baseball player Curt Flood to bring an antitrust
action against Major League Baseball in Flood v. Kuhn in 1972.106 Flood
lost and the domestic trade was allowed. Also present in that case was
the interpretation by the court of the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws. This exemption allows the athletes, through their players' union,
to agree to an act or restrictions on their rights that would otherwise
violate the antitrust laws. Through collective bargaining the athletes
may bargain away certain rights, including the right to have complete
freedom of movement or the right to negotiate freely with the team of
their choice.
In the international context, if a collective bargaining agreement is
not revised to reflect the international nature of a league, the players
may have an argument against any involuntary relocations such as
trades. It would seem that absent this specific consent by the players,
such a trade or reassignment by other means would exceed the agree-
ment between the parties.
106. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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Another group that may have a particular concern are amateur ath-
letes subject to the draft. Can an athlete be drafted by a team in a for-
eign country and required to play there if he does not desire to? The
answer is probably yes. The draft in professional football was found to
be a violation of the Sherman Act in Smith v. National Football League.
10 7
The NFL owners maintained that the draft provided a competitive bal-
ance, however, the court held that the NFL needed to use less restrictive
means to preserve its competitive balance. Thus, the court forbade the
NFL to have a sixteen round draft. However, following this decision the
National Football League Players' Association agreed to a twelve-round
draft in collective bargaining. That, via the labor exemption, caused the
draft to be "legalized." The collective bargaining process legalized the
draft in other leagues as well.
The unsuccessful challenge that college athletes eligible for the
draft have made, argues that they are not parties to the collective bar-
gaining agreement while they are in college and, therefore, they should
not be bound by an otherwise illegal restraint negotiated in a collective
bargaining agreement. In Wood v. National Basketball Association this was
the argument Leon Wood, a recently drafted basketball player, made.' 0 8
Wood argued that he should be able to negotiate with any NBA
franchise, not just the one that drafted him. The court held that the
National Basketball Players Association inclusively represented his
rights. 109
Under the Wood ruling, if the respective players' union has agreed
to the international draft, newly drafted parties will be subject to negoti-
ating solely with the team that drafts them. It does seem, however, that
Smith would certainly operate to the advantage of the newly drafted
player if there is not a collective bargaining agreement including the
international provisions. Before any internationalization, a league
would be wise to renegotiate relevant collective bargaining provisions
with its players' union.
CONCLUSION
The potential growth of American professional sports leagues into
international markets raises a number of intriguing issues. As has been
the case domestically, antitrust issues will probably continue to
predominate. Should the government decide not to pursue any poten-
tial antitrust violations, there is always the possibility that private entities
and individuals in the sports industry will. Historically, the government
has avoided extensive involvement.
With international growth, other existing problems in professional
leagues will have global implications as well, particularly labor issues
and the regulation of sports agents. All of these issues, including the
107. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
108. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
109. Id. at 963.
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antitrust issues, should be considered at length prior to the entry of pro-
fessional sports leagues into the international market.
Although, from a legal standpoint, the creation of an entirely new
league would be the wisest route to avoid legal entanglements, it almost
certainly would not be the best business decision. History has clearly
illustrated that expansion or merger of existing leagues is the most suc-
cessful route. The short life span of the United States Football League
illustrates this, as does the growth of the NFL after its merger with the
AFL and the growth of the NBA after its merger with the ABA. There is
no indication that adding an international aspect to a completely new
league would make it any more successful.
